Abstract: This essay enquires into the depictions of Justice through the ages, as well as into the myths surrounding these depictions, more particularly in Egypt, Greece, and Rome, as well as in modern times. The essay departs in significant respects from traditional interpretations by seeking to gain from the insights in relation to mythology and the use of symbols provided by psychoanalysis, structuralism, Heidegger's thinking on Being, and deconstruction. Insofar as psychoanalysis is concerned, of importance in the present context is Freud's analysis of symbolism in the interpretation of dreams and in myths, specifically his contention that the symbols employed there almost invariably have a sexual connotation. The approach of Claude Lévi-Strauss is the focus of the detour through structuralism, with Lévi-Strauss challenging certain of the most prevalent ideas in relation to myth, such as that there is some original version of a myth, usually believed to be the earliest version. In the case of Heidegger, of particular importance is his challenge to us "moderns" not to be too quick to believe that we understand ancient texts or the ancient conceptions of deities. He more specifically questions the common belief that the gods and goddesses are persons or that they are abstract personifications of concepts. Derrida, in his analysis of the texts of Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and Heidegger, further develops the ideas of each of these thinkers, seeking thereby to go beyond the Oedipus complex, beyond the security of structure, and beyond Being. After an analysis of depictions of the goddesses Ma'at, Themis, Dike, and Justitia, based on the insights gained in the preceding analysis, the essay concludes with a reading of the blindfold of Justice in her modern guise, which seeks to exceed metaphysics. Drawing specifically on Derrida's analysis of blindness in drawing, it arrives eventually not at the essence, but at the an-essence, of justice.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Modern depictions of Justice in drawings, paintings, and sculptures usually show a female figure holding a sword and scales. She is often blindfolded. These depictions are found all over the world in a great variety of locations, including marketplaces, town halls, public fountains, court buildings, and churches.
1 Images of Justice are also often found on book covers and in the title pages of law books, in caricatures, and these days, even decorating a variety of products unrelated to law. Her most well-known forebears in mythology are the Egyptian goddess Ma'at and the Greek goddesses Themis and Dike. The Romans referred to her as Justitia, as she remains known today, or alternatively as (Lady) Justice. 2 Other accessories associated with these figures through the ages include a protractor and a plumb line, a cornucopia, fasces, an olive branch, a (law) book or books, a globe, a skull, a foundation stone, a feather, an ostrich, a crane, an eagle, a dove, a snake, a dog, and a lion ( Figure 1 ). These images traditionally have been interpreted along the following lines: the measuring instruments, such as the scale, the protractor, and F I G U R E : Justice, after Raphael: a seated female figure looking at a balance that she holds up in her right hand, her other hand resting on the neck of an ostrich. Engraving, attributed to Andrea Procaccini, ca. -. (Location: British Museum, London, UK. © The Trustees of the British Museum) the plumb line, are understood as ensuring or rectifying order and equilibrium; and the sword as symbolizing power or authority. The blindfold is understood as ensuring impartiality and equal treatment, or meant as criticism, especially in caricatures, of justice that has failed. 3 The (law) books are said to point to the binding nature of written law and thus to legal certainty.
The present essay departs in significant respects from the traditional interpretation of these images. The enquiry to be undertaken will seek to gain from the insights that have been provided in relation to mythology and from the use of symbols by psychoanalysis, structuralism, Heidegger's thinking on Being, as well as deconstruction, to arrive eventually not at the essence, but the an-essence of justice. Our detour through psychoanalysis will confront us with Freud's analysis of symbolism in the interpretation of dreams and in myths. Of importance in this context is specifically Freud's contention that the symbols employed in dreams and in myths almost invariably have a sexual connotation. The approach of Claude Lévi-Strauss will be the focus of our detour through structuralism. We will see how he challenges certain of the most prevalent ideas about myth, such as that there is some original version of a myth, usually believed to be the earliest version. Additionally, the role of mediators is of great importance for Lévi-Strauss in the analysis of myth and can assist us greatly in understanding the role of the goddesses into which we enquire. In Heidegger's reflections on Being, he challenges us "moderns" not to be too quick to believe that we understand ancient texts or the ancient conceptions of deities. To understand something of ancient thinking we need first to rid ourselves of certain preconceptions. In the discussion of the texts of Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and Heidegger, this essay will briefly refer to Derrida's reading of and intervention in these texts. 11 We will see that in each instance he adopts the ideas of these thinkers and simultaneously develops them in a different direction. After a brief exposition of the insights to be gained from these thinkers, we will enquire in detail into some of the different ways the figures associated with Justice have been depicted through the ages, as well as into the myths surrounding these goddesses and the readings that have been and could be given to these images and myths. The essay will conclude with an attempted reading of (all) the images of justice, which will seek to exceed metaphysics, drawing specifically on Derrida's analysis of blindness in drawing.
12

F R E U D A N D S Y M B O L I S M
Because of the insights it provides into the workings of the unconscious, Freud believed that psychoanalysis could explain the themes in myth in a way similar to the interpretation of dreams. This is because in myth, as in fairy tales, folk sayings and songs, ritual, colloquial language, jokes, and poetic imagination, the same elements or symbols are employed as one finds in dream images and situations. 13 This does not mean that there is a complete overlap in relation to the use of symbols. The symbols that one finds in dreams do not necessarily appear elsewhere, and vice versa. In dreams, the symbols employed (a disguised representation of latent thoughts) almost exclusively give expression to sexual objects and sexual relations, whereas in other fields this is not necessarily the case, at least not at first sight. 14 One way of explaining this, of which Freud approves, would be with reference to Hans Sperber's theory that language originated in sexual desire-the calling to oneself of a sexual partner. 15 Linguistic roots developed further through the performance of work, as a substitute for sexual activity. Sexual words thus attained an additional meaning in the working context. These words later lost their sexual connotation and attained an independent meaning related to work.
d e V i l l e • I m a g e s o f J u s t i c e
The identity in the unconscious between a word and a thing, and the fact that the thing was originally referred to by the same word that was used to refer to genitals, thus makes it possible for the thing to become a symbol for genitals in a dream. 16 This explains why tools in dreams represent the male sexual organ and why those materials on which work is performed represent the female sexual organ. This in addition explains why dreams employ such a large number of sexual symbols that, as Freud points out, "preserve something of the earliest conditions." 17 The symbols employed in dreams and myths thus appear to stand in an intimate relation to sexuality 18 -specifically childhood sexuality. Freud was in particular alerted to the importance of the use of symbols in dreams by the observation that his patients could make no associations in relation to these images and events in their dreams. It was also clear that this did not result from resistance. As pointed out above, the same symbols employed in dreams are used in myths and elsewhere. These symbols thus appear to belong to unconscious mental life and are the same despite great differences in language and culture.
19
To understand the nature of Derrida's intervention in relation to Freud's sexual symbolism, a brief excursus into his "approach" is required here.
20
The readings that Derrida undertakes of Freud and others are informed by the insights of Freud and at the same time keep a certain distance from Freud because of the latter's continuing reliance on the concepts and logic of metaphysics. 21 Derrida, like Freud, is of the view that texts are not completely dominated by the intentions of their authors. Texts are heterogeneous or marked by tensions, and they tend to "repress" something in dealing with the main thesis. By rigorously analyzing the repressed element and its relation to the rest of the text, Derrida shows that that which was repressed actually provides the condition of possibility of the text. The text is then through this deconstructive reading repositioned or reframed. This heterogeneity is of course also a feature of Freud's texts that makes possible a reading of Freud that exceeds metaphysics. Of importance in this regard is specifically the repositioning by Derrida of the Oedipus complex in relation to Freud's own notion of the death drive. 22 Derrida's contention in this regard is that the Oedipus complex already involves a "repression" or dissimulation of the "desire" for death, which Derrida couples more closely than Freud with sexual pleasure, a "desire" in other words for absolute pleasure. This "desire beyond desire" thus exceeds and "precedes" the Freudian unconscious.
Derrida's reading of Freud has important implications for the latter's sexual symbolism. Freud's symbolism is based on the restricted economy of the Oedipus complex and retains the metaphysical assumption of a fixed origin. As appears from Derrida's analyses of signs and symbols, in for example Speech and Phenomena and Of Grammatology, these cannot be said to be anchored in a signified. 23 Any signified is itself in the position of signifier. This does not give way to meaninglessness, however, at least not in its traditional sense. The signs and symbols by means of which we relate to ourselves in everyday life as well as in dreams and myths are made possible by a certain dislocation in the self, of death lodged inside of life, and not through self-presence as is supposed by metaphysics. Freud's symbols themselves thus take part in a "play" of symbols, which makes them lose their value as symbols, as we will further see below. 24 In other words,
Freud's symbols should no longer be understood simply in their Oedipal sense, but in terms of the "desire" for death or for absolute pleasure.
L É V I -S T R A U S S A N D S T R U C T U R A L I S M
Lévi-Strauss revolutionized the field of anthropology and, more specifically, the study of myth. The idea of an evolutionary and progressive development in man's rational abilities (of which hints can still be found in Freud) finds its nemesis in Lévi-Strauss. He asserts in this regard that the thinking of "primitive" man is not radically different from that of "modern" man's scientific, logical, and rational mode of thinking. According to Lévi-Strauss, all human beings in fact share the same mode of thought. 25 The rigor in thinking moreover remains the same across the ages; only the nature of the things to which such thinking is applied changes, as shown by myth. 26 Lévi-Strauss specifically challenges the traditional idea that myths have an original meaning, usually said to be located in the earliest version of the myth. In his analysis of myth, Lévi-Strauss inter alia addresses the Oedipus myth, which we know is of central importance to Freud. 27 In the case of Lévi-Strauss, however, this analysis is not undertaken to find the literal meaning of the myth, but more importantly to illustrate the mechanism at work or the structural law of the myth. This "law" does not seek to show "how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact."
In his analysis, Lévi-Strauss includes all versions of the Oedipus myth, attempting to find a general pattern. This approach is based on the abovenoted premise that there is no true version of the myth, and that an earlier version is not necessarily to be privileged over later versions. 29 This approach ties in with Saussure's insight into the relation between meaning and language, which is that the value of a sign within language is not an inherent characteristic of such sign, but a consequence of the differences between signifiers and signifieds. 30 According to Lévi-Strauss, the myth in all its forms is an attempt to deal with the contradictory views in Greek thinking concerning the origins of man, that is, whether he is autochthonous (from the earth itself, born of himself through the agency of nature, as Oedipus, abandoned as a child, appears to be) or whether he comes from the sexual union between man and woman. In its derivative form, the question it seeks an answer to is whether man is born from the same or from what is different. Lévi-Strauss arrives at this interpretation through an analysis of the different versions of the myth according to the Saussurean distinction between parole (the different versions of the myth) and langue (the underlying structure), as well as between the synchronic and diachronic aspects of language. In this way, the myth, including all known versions, is shown to have a layered structure. In this analysis of the various versions of the Oedipus myth, which we cannot explore here in detail, Lévi-Strauss points to the important role played by "mediators" in myth. The sphinx in the Oedipus myth appears to play a similar mediating role to the ambiguous and equivocal characters he mentions from other myths, such as the trickster in the form of a raven or a coyote. These are intermediaries between carnivorous and herbivorous, like mist between sky and earth. 31 Other intermediaries mentioned by Lévi-Strauss include a scalp (between war and agriculture, a scalp being a war-crop), corn smut (between wild and cultivated plants), garments (between nature and culture), refuse (between the village and the outside), and ashes (between the roof/sky and hearth/ground). The sphinx is a hybrid, mythic creature and, as Lévi-Strauss points out in a footnote, also a female monster or phallic mother who terrifies and then rapes young men. Segal aptly refers to the sphinx as an "anomalous hermaphrodite monster." 32 Lévi-Strauss speaks in this regard of a chain of mediators that can easily replace each other in mythology, as they have essentially the same function, and that probably also characterize daily experience.
He refers in the latter respect to the French word for plant smut (nielle), which comes from the Latin nebula (mist), and to the luck-bringing power associated with refuse (an old shoe) and ashes (kissing the chimney sweep). 33 The gods in mythology, Lévi-Strauss points out, similarly act as mediators, which explains why they have contradictory attributes, for example, being both good and bad at the same time.
34
Lévi-Strauss again deals with the issue of mediation in The Origin of Table Manners . He contends that food taboos, good manners, the taboos on menstruating women, women who have recently given birth or miscarried, grave-diggers, widows and widowers, and those performing sacred rites, as well as puberty rites, education for girls, table and other mediatory utensils (such as combs, hats, head-scratchers, gloves, straws, forks) all have a similar mediating function. They seek to ward off the dangers of extremes, that is, of a cessation of regular periodicity or of overly rapid periodicity. In mythical thinking, Lévi-Strauss points out, extremes are often described such as eternal day or eternal night, as well as barrenness, premature aging, and madness. In the case of human beings as well as in nature, the manifestation of such extremes can be the consequence of nonadherence to these restrictions. It is believed that women, being periodic creatures themselves, are most in need of education and social subordination. 35 They are constantly threatened, and through them the whole world is threatened, either by the slowing down or the acceleration of the flow of events.
36
Daily, monthly, and seasonal periodicity as well as periodic menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth need to be ensured. 37 Lévi-Strauss ties this need for periodicity in women to the transition from nature to culture:
The transition from nature to culture demands that the feminine organism should become periodic, since the social as well as the cosmic order would be endangered by a state of anarchy in which regular alternation of day and night, the phases of the moon, feminine menstruation, the fixed period for pregnancy and the course of the seasons did not mutually support each other.
38
A certain distance therefore needs to be imposed to reduce the tension between the poles. This is done through insulators or mediators-that is, utensils, education, and taboo-that are imbued with inertia to "moderate our exchanges with the external world, and superimpose on them a domesticated, peaceful and more sober rhythm."
39 Lévi-Strauss here specifically d e V i l l e • I m a g e s o f J u s t i c e mentions the celestial canoe, which has a similar function in relation to the course taken by the sun (and the moon) as well as in the choice of marriage partners, which we will encounter again in our discussion of the goddess Ma'at. According to Derrida, structuralism takes certain important steps in questioning the assumptions of metaphysics. Structuralism's relation to metaphysics nonetheless remains ambivalent, and at times it is not vigilant enough about its reliance on the concepts of metaphysics in its critique thereof. This for example is the case in relation to the opposition between nature and culture referred to above. In the case of Lévi-Strauss, this continual attachment to metaphysics follows from both the fact that the full implications of the idea of a classificatory structure are not grasped as yet and from a residual nostalgia for origins and pure presence. 40 The notion of a structure, as Derrida points out, has operated since the inception of Western philosophy with the idea of a center, point of presence, or fixed origin that keeps the structure in place. 41 This center has in addition the role of limiting the "play" of the structure, the field of infinite substitutions, as Derrida refers to it. 42 Within the traditional concept of structure, "play" in this sense is allowed, but only within certain definable limits. The center is therefore inside the structure, yet it is also "outside" the structure in the sense that it is not itself subject to the play of the structure.
43
A certain reading of Lévi-Strauss must be adopted if the metaphysics implicit in his texts is to be exceeded. The heterogeneity of Lévi-Strauss's texts indeed allows for this. In the analysis of myths, as Derrida points out, Lévi-Strauss in fact abandons the idea of a center, a subject, a privileged reference, an origin, or an absolute archia. 44 Derrida refers here to the Bororo myth that Lévi-Strauss analyzes in The Raw and the Cooked, but the same could be said to apply to the analysis of the Oedipus myth referred to above. In his discussion of the Bororo myth that he employs as a "reference" or "key" myth, Lévi-Strauss points out that the myth nevertheless does not have any referential privilege and that it is simply a transformation of other myths in operation in Bororo society or borrowed from other societies. 45 Furthermore, the myth has no unity, nor absolute force; it has an a-centric structure. The discourse on myth should, according to Lévi-Strauss, follow suit and can therefore not be a scientific or philosophical discourse. To give a unity to myth would have to involve a projection. The discourse on myth must therefore renounce the epistemic discourse that requires an origin, founding basis, or center. It must also do without a subject and an author, as myths are themselves anonymous. Consequently, a book on myth must itself be a kind of myth, mythopoetic, or as Derrida refers to it, "mythomorphic." 46 Myth and the discourse on myth thus have no center that halts and grounds the play of substitutions.
47
In his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, we find an indication of this more radical idea of play 48 in what Lévi-Strauss says about notions such as the Melanesian mana (a kind of force). 49 The notion of mana (and we will see below that the same can be said of the goddesses of justice) is according to Lévi-Strauss not simply characterized by polysemia, but by overabundance and excess, which disrupts presence. 50 Notions such as mana as well as the mediators referred to above with the inertia imbued in them, are in this sense similar to that "spot" in a dream which, as Freud notes in The Interpretation of Dreams, is unplumbable: "a navel, as it were, that is, its point of contact with the unknown." 51 The latter, in turn, ties in with the insights of Freud in relation to what was termed above the "desire" for death. 52 Lévi-Strauss's mediators thus become radicalized in Derrida's intervention in structuralism by way of the new "concepts" he invents. Derrida's "open chain of undecidable 'concepts,'" such as différ-ance, the supplement, and the pharmakon, does not keep in place a stable structure, but disrupts that structure in a radical way. 53 This calls for a slightly different kind of analysis of myth than we find in Lévi-Strauss. Such analysis likewise requires invoking different versions of the same myth and ascertaining its underlying law. The law at stake does not however involve a structure and therefore a fixed origin, but instead a stricture or a pre-origin.
H E I D E G G E R A N D B E I N G
From Heidegger we get the admonition that we should not assume that we understand the concepts used by the Greeks as they understood them-or that we properly understand the gods and goddesses who are said to personify certain of these concepts. According to Heidegger, with the translation of ancient Greek texts into Latin, the original or authentic This understanding of death has profound implications for conceptuality and also for the concept of justice. In his later enquiry into Being, Heidegger sought to go back to the thinkers known as the pre-Socratics (a reference that Heidegger takes exception to) to understand the premetaphysical and preconceptual experience of Being. He for example contends in this regard that the Latin translation of the early Greek word physis as natura (nature) is inaccurate: it does not account for the word's original meaning. Instead, physis refers to "the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance-in short, the emerging-abiding sway."
61 Physis, in other words, gives expression to the experience of Being of the early Greeks.
The same problems arise when we seek to understand the essence of the Greek gods and goddesses. We should be careful in assuming too quickly that at stake here are persons or that they are abstract personifications of concepts. 62 In speaking of Aletheia, Heidegger for example points out in his reading of Parmenides that she is not the goddess of truth. 63 If she had been such, truth would simply have been entrusted to her; truth would have stood on one side and the goddess on the other. This is the case with Artemis, the goddess of hunting and of animals. They stand under her protection. In the case of Aletheia, truth does not simply stand under her protection; she is the truth, the goddess "truth." Truth, or in Heidegger's terminology (as translated), "unconcealment," is in other words experienced as a goddess. The same can be said of the goddess Dike. For Parmenides, as Heidegger points out, Dike "is the goddess."
64
She furthermore "guards the keys that alternately close and open the doors of day and night." Heidegger's profound reflections need to be taken seriously and, in the analysis below of Themis and Dike, attention will specifically be paid to the reflections of Erik Wolf, who is acutely aware of the importance of Heidegger's insights. There are nonetheless certain limitations in Heidegger's thinking that can be overcome only through a careful reading of his texts. As Derrida has noted, Heidegger still believes that death can be appropriated by Dasein, which, in light of Freud's thinking on the death drive, must be placed in question. Moreover, Heidegger tends to privilege the gathering and presencing of Being in his thinking rather than its disjoining or dissemination. In these respects his texts still show signs of belonging to metaphysics. Heidegger's belief in an original and authentic meaning that can still be found in the primordial thinkers-that is, Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus-also portrays an attachment to metaphysics. Yet something in Heidegger's texts at the same time exceeds metaphysics, for example when he speaks of death as "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein." 65 This is similarly the case in Heidegger's discussion in On Time and Being of the giving of Being and of time, and of the play of this gift.
66
This gift ultimately gives nothing and, as it precedes economy, it expects no return. In the case of Heidegger's reflections on the Anaximander fragment and his argument that dike should be understood in a way that goes beyond juridical-moral determinations of justice, 67 Derrida sees a similar relation between dike and adikia, with adikia corresponding with the other of Being or the perfect gift. 68 From Derrida's reading it follows that it is not only through a reflection on premetaphysical Greek thinking and nonWestern cultures 69 that a way beyond metaphysics can be found. All societies are after all characterized by a search for origins and presence. At the same time, these societies (and the same applies to Western metaphysics) do not constitute a totality and at some points exceed this desire for presence. The images of Justice, which as we saw are usually d e V i l l e • I m a g e s o f J u s t i c e read in terms of a restricted economy, can consequently all be read in this transgressive sense, irrespective of the age in which they appear. It is to such a reading that we now turn.
T H E G O D D E S S E S O F J U S T I C E Ma'at 70
Ma'at (mэ't) is a goddess in Egyptian mythology, a word in the Egyptian language, and also a central concept in Egyptian culture. 71 The word is written in hieroglyphics by a rectangular and wedge-shaped plinth or base, as well as by a feather. 72 Ma'at the goddess is then also usually depicted as a young woman standing on a foundation stone with a feather in her hair and with an ankh (the symbol of life) in her hand. Sometimes she has a scepter in her one hand (said to symbolize eternal rule) 73 and is depicted with feathered wings (Figure 2) . Reliefs, paintings, drawings, and sculptures depict her in a variety of ways.
Together with Thoth (associated with the ibis and the baboon), she for example stands in the bow of the boat that conveys Re during the day and at night through the underworld. 79 In the Book of the Dead, she appears on top of and her feather on one side of the scale against which the heart of the deceased is weighed to establish whether he is to die a second death by being devoured by Ammit, or may proceed to the afterlife (Figure 3) . Ma'at is often said to stand both for cosmic order and for social order, although these distinctions were not strictly drawn at the time and are therefore perhaps best avoided. 80 Everyone, especially the king, must speak, do, and uphold ma'at. 81 As Assmann points out, the King in this respect in a sense repeats and continues the act of creation, of which we will speak more below. 82 This subduing of chaos is a continuous process as the world permanently threatens to fall back into disorder or immobility. 83 Assmann in this respect speaks of Ma'at as a mediator (Mittler) or third term, in a similar sense as referred to above in our discussion of Lévi-Strauss. 84 According to Assmann, this role is also fulfilled by Thoth, the baboons who welcome the sun, and the king.
85
In the Instruction of Amenemope (chapter 20), Ma'at is spoken of as a "great gift of God." 86 This idea of Ma'at as gift as well as the closely related offering of Ma'at is usually understood in terms of a relation of exchange and reciprocity between man and the gods. 87 The doing and speaking of Ma'at are part of this relationship of exchange. In a great number of illustrations, a miniature figure of Ma'at is offered in a ritual to one of the gods by the king or some other royal figure as a sacrifice ( Figure 4 ).
88
Nonroyal donors also at times hold the figure of Ma'at, but this seems to involve a different ceremony as these depictions are usually to be found in the funerary context, analogous to the weighing of the soul, which one finds in the Book of the Dead.
90 When Ma'at is presented as an offering, she is usually seated, has an ostrich feather in her hair, and sits on a basket 97 The presentation of the offering of Ma'at is said to reciprocate for the divine gift of Ma'at (and/or of life) and reaffirms the legitimacy of the King's rule. 98 To be noted, however, is that the inscriptions accompanying the offering of Ma'at do not in all instances speak of a reciprocal relationship between donor and recipient. Instead, there is at times simply an acknowledgement of the gift from the gods without any return being expected from the offering of Ma'at. 99 In a similar kind of offering, involving that of the name of the king to the gods, the name of the king is sometimes equated with Ma'at. 100 Teeter reads this as an attempt to stress the association between the king and Ma'at to ensure legitimacy. 101 A number of kings moreover incorporated the word ma'at into their official names, thereby seeking further to establish a close association between themselves and Ma'at.
102
Ma'at is usually said to be the daughter of Re, the sun-god. 103 However, there are also a great variety of other myths in which she is associated in different ways with the gods. This can partly be explained by the fact that at different times, depending on political influence and power, certain (local) gods in Egypt became stronger than others, and the lesser gods either disappeared or were incorporated into the family structure of the (temporarily) stronger gods. 104 As the earlier discussion indicates, there are additional and perhaps more important "unconscious" reasons which necessarily play a role in these variations. 105 Re for example is also said to sit on the lap of Ma'at, suggesting that she is the mother of Re.
106
She is explicitly referred to as the mother of Amun, with whom Re is often equated in the form of Amun-Re. 107 In one of the only narratives With the rise in importance of Thoth, in accordance with the Hermopolis creation myth, the Ogdoad (the eight-fold) is said to have emanated from Thoth. 116 These are eight gods, in four male-female pairs in the form usually of snakes (female) and frogs (male) or in human form with snake and frog heads, who represent the primordial chaos before the birth of Re from an egg. Certain sources indicate that Ma'at is the mother of the Ogdoad, 117 which ties in with her being represented as the mother of Re. She is also said to have risen with Re from the primeval waters at the time of the creation.
118
These creation myths can be better understood when account is taken of the (partly) intransitive nature of the model at stake here. Assmann points out in this regard that in Egyptian myths the act of creation is not to be understood only in terms of the transitive model of a subject vis-à-vis an object. Creation also takes place intransitively: the world appears as a self-unfolding process. 119 The gods in terms of this model therefore do not precede the creation and cannot be understood separate from it. A combination of these two models is to be found in Egyptian creation myths.
120
In light of what was said earlier, one should resist the temptation to view the role and function of Ma'at only in circular or reciprocal terms, or, closely tied to this, viewing her simply as a "moral ideal. "exceptional texts," 122 there is clearly a dimension to her that goes beyond the circular return and instead sets this circulation in motion. Of great importance for our reading is the understanding of Ma'at as a force: "die Kraft, die 'der unbegrenzten Bewegung Grenzen, Ziel und Bewußtsein gibt,'" 123 which stands in tension with Isfet, the latter threatening to bring the circular flow of the creation process to a standstill.
124
Ma'at in other words stands in tension with inertia or death. As we saw above, however, Ma'at herself is often associated with death. She is said to reside in and to satisfy the sacred necropolis, as well as to be the Mistress of the West, and is thus closely associated with the goddess Imntt, who shares with her the feather emblem.
Being "joined with Ma'at" was moreover a euphemism for death. Her association with death thus went far beyond the judgment of the dead.
125
She can be said to embody the relation between life and death. This also enables us to understand differently the incorporation of Ma'at into the name of the kings and the offering of the name of the king to the gods, especially where the name was equated with Ma'at. The proper name, as Derrida has shown, is subject to the law of iterability, and therefore can be said to announce death, as it will always survive the bearer of the name. The name, as Derrida puts it, "is always and a priori a dead man's name, a name of death." 126 The incorporation of death into the name of the king can be said to give expression to this law. The offering of the name of the king (in association with Ma'at) can similarly be read as a confirmation of this law and, as we will see below, perhaps as a pure gift. In both respects the association of Ma'at with the subversive god of writing, the god of death, Thoth, is also important ( Figure 5 ).
127
Like Thoth, Ma'at has no fixed identity: she is a woman and a man, the daughter and the mother of Re, and takes on many different forms.
128
This problematizes the understanding of Ma'at as a "concept" in the traditional philosophical-juridical sense, as she has no essence, but instead an an-essence. When we take account of Freud's symbolism, the representation of Ma'at with a scepter and an ankh in her hands, the bird feather, 129 as well as her connection with snakes and frogs (her children), baskets and jars, and blindness, clearly alludes to sexuality, but as pointed out earlier, in a more transgressive sense than we usually find in Freud. 130 At stake here is the desire for death, a pleasure without end. 131 Moreover, according to Freud, the sun is a sublimated father-symbol. 132 Although Egyptian d e V i l l e • I m a g e s o f J u s t i c e mythology can be said to be father-centered (e.g., Re is the one who gives life through his rays, that is, sperm), 133 with Ma'at upholding this order, the order is as we saw, not an origin in itself, but constituted from a more primordial chaos. This relation between order and chaos is not to be understood in oppositional or dialectical terms, but as that which gives rise to the dialectic as well as the sending of Being. 134 The chaos must itself be understood in close connection to sexuality, although the latter should not be restricted by chaos's connotations. Perhaps the idea of Ma'at as gift best explains her strange nature. As indicated, this is not to be understood in terms of a circular return, which would disqualify the gift as gift. 135 Ma'at, as we saw, serves as food or nourishment for gods, humans, and all living beings: she willingly offers herself to be consumed. As Freud points out, 136 eating and sexuality stand in close (unconscious) relation to each other as well as to self-destruction or making a gift of oneself. 137 It is thus through a sacrifice or perfect gift of herself that the circular return of the sun becomes possible. She "contains within herself" the forces of both order and disorder, as well as the relation between them. This is not a relation of simple opposition, and her role is also not a mediating one in the dialectical sense. 
Themis
Themis is known as a titan goddess, the daughter of Ouranus (sky) and of Gaia/Ge (earth), and thus stems from a time preceding the Olympic gods. Gaia is, together with Eros (the Begetter), Nyx (Night), Tartaros (the Underworld), and Erebus (the void), one of the first to be born from Chaos. 138 The latter should not be understood in terms of its modern meaning of confusion or turmoil, but as "a measureless, supportless, and groundless yawning. The close association of Gaia with joining, limit, fixity, and light should thus not be taken too far. Wolf clearly realizes this. As he points out, at stake in the distinction between Gaia and her brothers and sisters is not a simple opposition, but an overlapping coming-into-being and departure. The "binding force," itself springing from chaos, and the one who brings the difference to unity, is Eros, the begetter. Wolf contests the interpretation that seeks to explain the transformation that takes place in Themis from the pre-Olympian (titanic) to the Olympian era as one from a personification of the laws of nature to a representation of the positive legal order, or from a representation of physis (nature) to one of nomos (law). According to Wolf, these interpretations are based on assumptions that do not tally with the life-world of the Greeks at the time.
151 He sees the difference as an unfolding or development in the essential nature of Themis, rather than as a transformation. The role she plays as wife and advisor and the motherly care she shows toward Zeus, Apollo, and Athene are performed in light of destiny; her own inclinations and the wishes of the other gods have no influence. She does not do this out of love for Zeus or because of an interest she has in the "old" or the "new" order. In what she does, one can instead see the necessary relation between the different generations of gods.
152
Wolf thus seems to view Themis as another name for Being, also and perhaps especially, for the Being of Dasein. 153 Themis retains her role as one of the Moirai in Olympus, where she declares both to gods and to human beings their destiny, a role she takes over from Gaia. 154 In one of the most well-known depictions of Themis, on red ceramic dating from 430 BC, she sits on a tripod at Delphi. The childless King Aigeus of Athens approaches her for an oracle concerning the birth of a son. She has a phiale or bowl in her left hand and a laurel sprig in her right hand ( Figure 6 ).
155
Hirzel sees her role here not as that of prophetess in the sense of one who predicts the predetermined future, but as one who gives firm advice concerning how one should act.
156 This role as oracle is tied to her being one of the Moirai. 157 Thus the future is also predetermined by a fixed order. 158 Themis, because of her role as conveyer of hidden sayings and destiny, is called Ichnaia-the hidden, the one who tracks down, who traces. 159 Wolf sees the binding, joining role of Themis also being played out in her opening of the symposia of the gods and provision of the meal, as well as in her summoning of the gods to an assembly, on Zeus's command, and dissolving it again. 160 She does the same in relation to the councils of men, assisting them in overcoming their search for self-interest and proceeding to a discussion of their mutual interests.
161
It should be clear from the above discussion that much of what was said regarding Ma'at is also applicable to Themis. Their roles extend far beyond the legal order. Wolf's acute observations on the nature of Themis and Gaia are of specific relevance here. Although he emphasizes the ordering function of Themis, he at the same time notes the chaos from which she arises. This chaos is moreover not left behind, but finds expression in the an-essence that appears from the narratives surrounding Themis, as well as the accessories usually associated with her. Apart from the tripod, laurel leaf, and phiale referred to above, and her association with mother-Earth, we also find depictions of Themis with a stick-like torch and a tray or offering basket (kanoun). 162 There is furthermore a (somewhat uncertain) depiction of her with an oinochoe (libation jug). 163 Freud again assists us in grasping the sexual nature of these symbols, 164 which again need to be understood however, Dike herself plays the role of the punisher of wrongs, employing a sword made for her by Aesa. In later accounts, she increasingly takes on the role of judge, and specifically of imposing criminal punishment.
172
Wolf sees these two sides of Dike as related to her belonging to the Horai as well as the Moirai. As one of the Horai, she brings to light the hidden truth, similar to the goddess Aletheia. Wolf sees here a close age-old relation among truth, light, and law. 173 As one of the Moirai, she is a veiled, metamorphosing, destiny goddess who works in secret and brings calamity to people. 174 She herself imposes punishment. Even here she does not wreak vengeance, but simply expiates the injustice that has been done. 175 The balancing function she fulfils presumably motivates the reference in the poets to the scale of Dike. Wolf sees in this respect an important development in the role ascribed to Dike.
176 At first she lives amongst men, does not exercise any power herself, and simply reports to Zeus, with the latter imposing punishment. In later mythology, however, the chthonic-dark side of Dike is increasingly emphasized, and a gradual fusion takes place between the previously sharply distinguished Themis and Dike. Dike in later times takes up her seat also in Hades and is described as a cosmic power in relation to the whole world. In this respect she inter alia ensures that the star constellations that have lost their way are brought back to the order that characterizes their essence. This is what she requires of every being. 177 She is in this respect also closely associated with time, as she ensures that things occur in their time as it has been ordained. The well-known depiction of Dike beating Adikia (a tattooed, allegedly barbarian woman) with a hammer seems to give expression to this idea ( Figure 7) .
Adikia is usually translated as injustice, 181 an interpretation that has been placed in question by Derrida's reading of Heidegger's The Saying of Anaximander. 182 The relation between Dike and Adikia appears to be more complex than that of a simple hierarchical opposition. According to Wolf, we also see something of this complexity in Dike's relation to Eris, another of her rivals, together with Adikia, Hybris, and Lethe.
183
Lethe herself is the daughter of Eris. 184 Eris again is the daughter of Nyx (Night, which must here be understood in the sense of annihilationthe Night, which as Heidegger puts it, "lets all that is present disappear into concealment"). 185 The relation between these forces, however, is not d e V i l l e • I m a g e s o f J u s t i c e to be viewed in oppositional terms, but as one of différance, the pre-origin of metaphysical oppositions, as also expressed by the relation between Dike and Adikia. Dike's other, which nonetheless does not belong to her, must again be understood as the desire for absolute pleasure. In this respect it can be noted that the hammer/staff (with which Dike hits Adikia), as Freud assures us, is undoubtedly a male sexual symbol. 186 Pindar's reference to the "unsullied fountain Dike," also does not escape from sexual symbolism. 187 It can moreover be noted that Dike's daughter Hesykhia is born to her without the need for sexual intercourse with a man. 188 She remains a virgin, 189 which of course does not make her devoid of (absolute) pleasure.
Justitia
Unlike Ma'at, Themis, and Dike, the Roman goddess Justitia was not reckoned among the major gods. As with most of the other Greek gods taken over in Roman mythology, she is mentioned in very few narrative accounts. From the texts of Ovid and Virgil, one obtains the image of a goddess of Justice who has left the earth because of man's corrupt and wicked nature and who now scarcely concerns herself any longer with human affairs. From these and other accounts, it furthermore appears that Justitia does not only show analogies with Dike (with whom she is usually equated), 190 but also with Astraia/Astraea, another daughter of Themis and Zeus, alternatively regarded as the daughter of Astraeus and Eos. 191 She is in this respect known as the constellation Virgo, the virgin of the stars, and as the nurse of the whole universe. No images of Justitia from Roman times have remained, and where mention is made of sculptures, the latter appear to show some correspondence with Dike and Nemesis and to be of Greek rather than Roman origin. 192 It was Aequitas (fairness) rather than Justitia who was personified by the Romans. Kissel explains this with reference to the fact that Justitia was (mostly) equated with positive law, whereas Aequitas required the balancing of all the circumstances of the case. In later times, Aequitas and Justitia were not clearly distinguished from each other as symbols. We thus find Aequitas or Justitia depicted on coins with a cornucopia and with scales, sometimes with a scepter or a staff, sometimes without any attributes. Sometimes only the head of a woman appears, with the transcription, "Justitia."
193
In the Middle Ages, images of Justitia are characterized by a combination of Christian and Greek-Roman thinking. 194 In this regard, the sword of Dike and the scales of Aequitas/Justitia begin to play an important role. Justitia now becomes one of the Christian virtues entering into battle with the vices. She is personalized and sometimes depicted with accessories, such as a scale. In exceptional instances, Justitia is a male figure. 
195
In one image from the eleventh century, Justitia is depicted with a protractor and (optical) plummet, together with three other virtues. The crucified Christ is in the middle with the female figures Ecclesia and Synagoga on his right and left, respectively. Synagoga, representing Judaism, the Old Testament, and old law, is depicted blindfolded with a broken staff. Ecclesia, the New Law, the Church, wears a crown. 196 In depicting the Last Judgment and the weighing of the soul of man, use is sometimes made of some of the accessories usually associated with Justitia. In this way, Christ is depicted with a sword as judge of the world, alternatively with a palm branch, a lily, or a scale. 197 Albrecht Dürer, in a copperplate print from 1500, portrayed Christ with sword and scales as "sun of justice" (Figure 8 ).
198
From around the twelfth century, the archangel Michael, standing next to Christ, and with increasing emphasis, takes over the role of weighing man's soul, showing some similarity with our earlier discussion of Ma'at. From around the thirteenth century, there are images in which Michael also divides the deceased into good and evil and executes punishment.
Michael is from then on, as a rule, depicted with a scale and often also with a sword, in addition to a lance, which becomes less emphasized. From around the sixteenth century, the archangel Michael is depicted on his own as angel of justice and judgment, with a sword and scales in association with the last judgment. 200 Justitia herself is at times depicted with the wings of an angel.
201
From around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Justitia starts being depicted with a sword and scale (although not exclusively so) and at times separate from the other virtues. 202 Kissel expresses his frustration at the impossibility of adequately explaining the reason for this development. He nevertheless attempts to do so partly with reference to the revival in Roman law from the eleventh century onward, as well as the Renaissance in general. This revival, as he points out, also was accompanied by a renewed interest in the symbols associated with the law in antiquity, including the goddesses of justice. 203 The cornucopia, with its associations of superabundance and giving, was not really suited for incorporation. The scale of the Roman goddess of Justice, however, fitted well with the spirit of the times as it called for a careful and emotionless balancing of arguments. The scale also conformed with the emphasis placed on the synallagma, that is, the reciprocal obligations between the parties to a contract. The sword in the hand of Justitia, Kissel points out, was similarly well suited because of its association with judicial power, specifically in relation to criminal matters, coupled with the widespread reliance on the death penalty. Justitia with a sword was also important for another reason, that is, the attempts to establish a separate jurisdiction for the state vis-à-vis the church. 204 The sword as symbol could in this respect assist in secularizing (Christian) natural law. The (secular) Justitia with sword and scales now stood over against the (spiritual) archangel Michael, himself with sword and scales. Justitia herself also takes on a double role. Justitia as religious symbol and Christian virtue was now associated with the after-life, whereas Justitia as secular symbol was associated with worldly justice.
205
The blindfold of Justitia appears for the first time in 1494 in a woodcut by Albrecht Dürer, illustrating Sebastian Brant's poem Stultifera Navis (Ship of Fools) (Figure 9 ). cates that this illustration was a criticism of the application of customary law in criminal matters. 209 In a hand-painted allegorical representation of Peter Vischer from 1524, the blindfold however seems to bear a positive connotation. Justitia, naked and without any accessories, is depicted placing a blindfold over the eyes of the Emperor. It is interpreted in its Reformation context as saying that no Pope is needed, but only a just emperor. 210 This was the first time that the blindfold in this context was given a positive connotation in the fine arts. 211 As Kissel points out, after the Middle Ages and until about the nineteenth century, Justitia has predominantly retained the form she attained in the thirteenth century, allowing for small changes depending on the fashion of the times 212 and ignoring caricatures. 213 Images of her also increasingly adorned public and private spaces. Especially since the twentieth century, experimentation with different shapes of Justitia has taken place, and at times she is named Themis.
J U S T I C E : T H E V I S I B L E A N D T H E I N V I S I B L E
The outline of a reading that would exceed, to a certain extent, metaphysics has already been given above in relation to Ma'at, Themis, Dike, and Justitia. It remains to say a few words about the blindfold of Justitia (Figure 10 ), which, as we will see, ties in closely with what was said above regarding the other figures of justice. 214 According to Freud, a clear relation appears from myth, dreams, and fantasies between the eye and the male sexual organ. 215 The anxiety about blindness therefore represents a fear of castration, and Oedipus's self-blinding can be understood as a mitigated form of the punishment of castration. 216 Derrida's understanding of blindness seeks to go beyond the restricted economy of the Oedipus complex. 217 In a number of texts, Derrida points to a relation among blindness, death, and desire. 218 We see the same relation expressed in Memoirs of the Blind. 219 Here, Derrida points out that Western philosophy, since its Greek origins, has posited a natural relation among seeing, knowing, the sun, light, the father, the eidos, and the truth. 220 Derrida specifically seeks to interrogate the idea of painting as originating in present perception. He contends first that a drawing (and something similar can clearly be said in relation to painting and sculpting) is blind; and second, that a drawing depicting someone who is blind is in a sense a self-portrait of the draftsman, of the draftsman as "blind." 221 This is because drawing is based not on present perception, as is often believed, but on memory, understood in a certain way. 222 This follows from the fact that in drawing, the vision of the object that is being drawn must be "switched off." Drawing must in a sense take place in "blindness"; the trait or strokes of drawing, "must proceed in the night." 223 We can also say that one draws only "on the condition of not seeing." Being blind(folded) can hence be understood as going against nature in the above sense: it says that one does not want to see, "would like not to know," that one desires not to bear witness to the truth. 225 This does not simply involve the positing of an opposition between sight and blindness, between truth and lying, between sight and memory. A presentation of blindness or of being blindfolded as an object to sight indeed no longer privileges seeing or the truth in alluding to the memory that must be invoked when drawing. However, there is more to it. At stake is a structural law of blindness as the condition of possibility of truth, knowledge, and vision. 226 Blindness as the theme of a drawing thus represents the unrepresentable. This can be explained further as follows: someone who is blind(folded) bears witness to what can be referred to as the an-essence of memory. This an-essence is constituted by the fact that memory itself proceeds from out of a certain more radical blindness. One could also say, following Derrida, that memory itself entails "the law of disproportion, dissymmetry, and expropriation" or that "in anamnesis itself, there is amnesia." 227 We have to turn to Archive Fever and "Freud and the Scene of Writing," where Derrida deals with the "origin" of memory, and which he implicitly relies on in this context, to understand what is at stake here. 228 From these texts it appears that what is here named "blindness"
involves the annihilation of memory, which itself ensures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, and of reproduction.
229
Blindness is thus not to be understood in its literal sense, but as a reference to the ultimate form of blindness, that is, death, 230 or more precisely, referring again to the above-mentioned texts, the desire for death. 231 It is only through a dissimulation of this desire that works of art, as well as other acts of the imagination, such as law, become possible. Thus, Justitia blindfolded portrays something of the condition of possibility of law. 232 As we saw earlier, works of art (including depictions of Justice) say something about the artist, about the process of the creation of art, as well as of mankind in general. They, in other words, bear witness to the desire for death that exceeds circular exchange. A reading of the blindfold of Justitia as allowing for inner perception and impartiality or as a critique of being blindfolded in favor of sight, would on the other hand entail reinscribing blindness into an economy of exchange.
233
In conclusion, it can be said that in the depictions of Justice through the ages, different ways have been found in which to give expression to the inscription of mankind in différance. This explains in a way why these images of Justice have captured the fascination of humanity, as well as why some features have remained and others have disappeared. What becomes visible in the Egyptian Ma'at, the Greek Themis and Dike, and the Roman and modern Justitia is, as we saw, usually understood in the sense of order and balance-a relation of exchange, in other words. However, as Derrida points out, the becoming visible does so only on condition of the absolutely invisible withdrawing from sight. 234 The latter, with reference to "Force of Law," can be referred to as unconditional justice, a form of giving that expects no return, and that distinguishes itself from law and sovereignty. 235 What we view as traits of Justitia, Themis, Dike, and Ma'at, whether in their conventional or psychoanalytical sense, are, as we also saw, in each appearance accompanied and remain haunted by a certain retrait (withdrawal) of chaos, darkness, death, and desire. The nature of this absolute invisibility is perhaps best expressed by Derrida, with reference to Merleau-Ponty:
To be the other of the visible, absolute invisibility must neither take place elsewhere nor constitute another visible, that is, something that does not yet appear or has already disappeared-something whose spectacle of monumental ruins would call for reconstitution, regathering from memory, rememberment. This nonvisible does not describe a phenomenon that is present elsewhere, that is latent, imaginary, unconscious, hidden, or past; it is a "phenomenon" whose inappearance is of another kind. where he points out that the original form of myth "is and remains forever elusive. However far back we may go, a myth is known only as something that has been heard and repeated." . Derrida, supra note , at -. . Id. at . . In Glas, Derrida refers to "play" in this sense as a "pure essenceless by-play, a play that plays limitlessly"; Jacques Derrida, Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, ), a. . This happens for example with Karenga, supra note . . Assmann, supra note , at . . Id. at , also at . My translation: "The force 'which gives to the unlimited movement limits, aim, and consciousness.'" . Id. at . . Teeter, supra note , at -. . Derrida, The Ear of the Other, supra note , at . . See in this respect again Derrida, supra note , at -. . Freud, supra note , at XXIII:, describes this characteristic depiction of the Egyptian gods in apt terms: "The hymns in honour of these gods say almost the same things about all of them, and identify them with one another unhesitatingly, in a manner hopelessly confusing to us. The names of gods are combined with one another, so that one of them may almost be reduced to being an epithet of the other." . The ostrich feather is very interesting symbolically because a bird in dreams usually represents the phallus, its erection being similar to a bird's flight, suspending the laws of gravity (Freud, supra note , at V:, XXII:). The long (phallic) neck of the ostrich could perhaps be said to make up symbolically for its inability to fly. The equation Freud (id. at XV:) draws between woods and bushes with pubic hair could perhaps also be applied to an ostrich's feathers. In general, birds in dreams represent sexual intercourse (id. at V:). From Ma'at's association with Imntt one could furthermore contend that the feather represents death. Levi-Strauss, supra note , at -, similarly draws a relation between feathers (birds belonging to both the sky and the earth (at ) and pubic hair as mediators (quillwork and scalps are also mentioned here). . See Freud, supra note , at XII:-, XV:-. . Derrida, supra note , at . Two observations of Freud, supra note , at XXIII:-n and X:, need to be juxtaposed here: "No other people of antiquity did so much [as the Egyptians] to deny death or took such pains to make existence in the next world possible." And: "According to psycho-analytic theory, I told him [the Rat Man] every fear corresponded to a former wish which was now repressed." . Freud, supra note , at XII:, -; XV:. . See in this regard Freud, id. at XII:,  (Schreber case). . Derrida, Glas, supra note , at a. . Derrida, Given Time, supra note , at -. . Freud, supra note , at XVII:-. . See Derrida, Glas, supra note , at b, b, b. . Erik Wolf, Griechisches Rechtsdenken: Vorsokratiker und frühe Dichter (Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, ), .
